

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 ANKARA 02482 01 OF 02 041841Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----041846Z 055440 /53

O P 041625Z APR 77
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7015
INFO AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 ANKARA 2482

EXDIS

NOFORN

VIENNA FOR LEDSKY

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, TU, CY, GR
SUBJ: CYPRUS: RESTRAINTS ON TURKISH POLICY

1. I MET TODAY WITH A SENIOR, AND FULLY-INFORMED, TURKISH MFA OFFICIAL WHO ASKED THAT I COME TO HIS OFFICE ALONE FOR WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS AN "ESTRORDINARILY FRANK" UNOFFICIAL TALKS. HE ASKED THAT I NOT REVEAL HIS NAME IN REPORTING THIS CONVERSATION-IN FACT, TWICE DURING THE CONVERSATION HE ASKED THAT I NOR REPOT IT AT ALL. (HE KNOWS, HOEVER, THAT I AM DOING SO). THERE ERE NO NOTETAKERS PRESENT, BUT MY INTERLOCUTOR WAS ACCOMPANIED BY ANOTHER MFA OFFICIAL WITH WHO HE HAS WORKED CLOSELY ON CYPRUS MATTERS.

2. HE BEGAN BY INDICATING THAT WHAT HE HAD TO SAY NOT ONLY REFLECTED HIS OWN VIEWS BUT ALSO FOREIGN MINISTER CAGLAYANGIL'S, AND THAT THE LATTER KNEW ABOUT THE
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 ANKARA 02482 01 OF 02 041841Z

CONVERSATION HE WAS ABOUT TO HAVE WITH ME. HE THEN MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
A. THE U.S. CONGRESSIONAL EMBARGO HAD PLACED THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY IN A VERY DIFFICULT POSITION AS FAR AS MOVING FORWARD WITH ANY INITIATIVES FOR A CYPRUS SOLUTION. POLITICAL LEADER, AND SPECIFICALLY PRIMIN DEMIREL, HAD BEEN DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE

DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF DOING SOMETHING
CONSTRUCTIVE WITH REGARD TO A CYPRUS SOLUTION " UNDER
DURESS." BUT IN TIME THERE HAD BEEN SOME CONGRESIONAL
AMELORATION OF THE INTIAL EMBARGO, AND THIS HAD
LED TO A WOMEWHAAT IMPROVED ATOMOSPHERE IN WHICH THE
PRIMIN COULD WORK. AT THE SAME TIME, THE PRIMIN HAS
ALWAYS BEEN CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED TO FIND A SOLUTION TO
THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AND IT WAS HIS VIEW THAT THE
DENKTASH/MAKARIOS TALKS OPENED UP AN OPPROTUNITY FOR
TURKEY TO DO SOMETHING. THE PRIMIN REGARDED IT AS
"AN HISTORIC OCCASION, WHICH SHOULD NOT BE LOST." AS
A RESULT, BOTH THE PRIMIN AND THE FONMIN HAS SINCE
THAT TIME MADE A STRENUOUS EFFORT TO MOVE THE SITUATION
FORWARD. PRESIDENT KORUTURK AND CHIEF OF THE TURKISH
GENERAL STAFF (TGS), GENERAL SANCAR, WERE " CAREFULLY CONSULTED
AND DULY PREPARED", THE BASIC PROPOSITION BEING THAT
SOME MOVEMENT SHOULD BE MADE TOWARD A CYPRUS SOLUTION
BECAUSE, DESPITE GOT OBJECTIONS TO "LINKAGE", THIS WAS
OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO TURKEY. BOTH AGREED WITH PRIMIN,
FONMIN AND SENIOR MFA CAREERISTS THAT IT WOULD BE HARMFUL
TO TURKEY'S LARGER SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS IF THE SITUATION
WERE ALLOWED TO DRAG ON, AND THAT IT WOULD BE
PARTICULARLY HARMFUL TO TURKEY IF THE IMPRESSION WERE
GIVEN ABROAD THAT IT WAS FOORT-DRAGGING.
B. UNFORTUNATELY, STRENUOUS EFFORTS IN THE NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC) DID NOT PRODUCE THE RESULT WHICH WAS
SOUGHTU. THE ERBAKAN GROUP, IN AN "OBSTINATE" AND
"OPINIONATED" WAY, STRONGLY AND SUCCESSFULLY OPPOSED
EVERYTHING" WE ARE TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH." THE GREEK SIDE
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 ANKARA 02482 01 OF 02 041841Z

DIDN'T HELP BY LEAKING THE MAP AND BY LATER MAKING
UNREASONABLE DEMANDS FOR AN INSTANT TURKISH REACTION.
BUT THE REAL PROBLEM WAS DENKTASH'S UNWILLINGESS TO
TAKE ANY POSITION REGARDING TERRITORY WITHOUT THE CLEAR
AND OFFICIAL SUPPORT OF THE GOT- AND THE LATTER WAS NOT
OBTAINABLE IN THE PRESENT PRE-ELECTION CIRCUMSTANCES
BECAUSE OF THE ERBAKAN FACTIN'S SUCCESSFUL BLOCKING
TACTICS IN THE NSC.
C. WHAT IS NEEDED, NOW, IT TIME. BETWEEN
NOW AND THE ELECTION-AND ESPECIALLY IF THE ELECTION
IS IN JUNE (AN EXPECTIATION BUT NOT YET
A CERTAINTY)- THERE IS SIMPLY NOTHING THE GOT CAN DO
BEYOND THE POSITION IT IS PRESENTLY TAKING IN VIENNA.
DENKTASH HAS TOLD ANKARA THAT THE GREEK
PROPOSAL ON TERRITORY IS SO BAD THAT IT SHOULD
NOT REPEAT NOT BE DISCUSSED; IT SHOULD BE REJECTED OUT OF HAND.
HE HAS ALSO SAID THAT THE ONLY SOULUTION NOW IS A
UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (UDI) FOR THE TURKISH
REGION. NEVERTHELESS, THE GOT WILL NOT PERMIT

THE GREEK PROPOSAL TO BE REJECTED AT THIS TIME, AND IS INSISTING THAT IT BE DISCUSSED. NOR WILL THE GOT PERMIT UDI UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, AND AS LONG AS THE TURKISH ARMY IS ON CYPRUS, THE MAINLAND TURKS WILL HAVE THE FINAL SAY ON THAT. BUT WHAT TURKEY CANNOT REPEAT NOT DO, DESPITE THE HIGH HOPES RECENTLY ENTERTAINED BY A NUMBER OF ITS KEY OFFICIALS (INCLUDING MY INTERLOCUTOR), IS MAKE TERRITORIAL COUNTER PROPOSALS OR IN EFFECT "ENGAGE IN SUSTAINED NEGOTIATIONS" IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN NOW AND THE TURKISH ELECTIONS. D. USG HELP IS NEEDED IN PREVENTING THE GREEK SIDE FROM EXPLOITING THE SITUATION. "THERE MUST NOT REPEAT NOT BE A RUPTURE IN THE CURRENT NEGOTIATING EFFORT", HE EMPHASIZED. DESPITE THE DISCOURAGING NATURE OF THE IMMEDIATE SITUATION, THE PROSPECTS IN THE LONGER TERM FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE TURKISH ROLE AND A RATIONAL SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM ARE GREATLY ENHANCED AS A RESULT
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PAGE 04 ANKARA 02482 01 OF 02 041841Z

OF WHAT HAS BEEN RECENTLY TRANSPIRING IN ANKARA. HE THEN ASKED THAT WHAT HE WAS ABOUT TO TELL ME BE CLOSELY HELD WITHIN THE USG (AND THAT NONE OF HIS COMMENTS BE REPEATED TO UN OR THIRD-COUNTRY OFFICIALS). HE PARTICULARLY ASKED THAT HIS NAME NEVER BE TIED TO THE COMMENTS HE WAS ABOUT TO MAKE ON TERRITORY. "IF THAT EVER HAPPENS, I WILL HAVE TO DENY THAT I EVER SAID THESE THINGS TO YOU", HE SAID. E. BEFORE GETTING TO TERRITORY, HE FIRST SAID THAT, AS HE WASURE THE USG SURMISED, THE TURKISH CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSAL WAS "JUST THE BEGINNING" AND THE TURKS ARE FULLY PREPARED, AS THE NEGOTIATIONS PROGRESS, TO MAKE " FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS" WITH RESPECT TO IT. THIS CANNOT REPEAT NOT BE DONE BETWEEN NOW AND THE ECLECTIONS, HOWEVER. F. ONCE THE ELECTIONS ARE OVER, THE TURKS WILL ALSO BE IN A POSITION TO DO SOMETHING SIGNIFICANT ON TERRITORY. HERE HE WAS OPERATING NOT JUST ON HOPE, BUT ON SOLIS EVIDENCE. THE EVIDENCE HE CITED HAD COME FROM RECENT NSC MEETINGS AT WHICH HE HAD BEEN PRESENT. THE TURKISH GENERAL STAFF HAD BRIEFED THE NSC ON THE AREAS WHICH THE TURKS "COULD DO WITHOUT." THESE AREAS WERE "VERY SUBSTANTIAL." WHEN I ASKED WHAT HE MEANT BY

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PAGE 01 ANKARA 02482 02 OF 02 041843Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----041847Z 055467 /53

O P 041625Z APR 77
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7016
INFO AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 ANKARA 02482

EXDIS

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SUBSTANTIAL, HE REPLIED THAT THEY EMBRACED THE FOLLOW-
ING: VAROSHA; KOKKINA; AREAS BETWEEN FAMAGUSTA AND
THE ERCAN AIRPORT; AND AREAS BETWEEN NICOSIA AND LEFKE.
THESE PROPOSALS WERE ACCEPTED IN THE NSC NOT ONLY BY
THE MILITARY BUT BY ALL THE COALITION PARTNERS EXCEPT
ERBAKAN AND HIS NATIONAL SALVATION PARTY (NSP). MY MFA
COLLEAGUE ALSO EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE (A CONFIDENCE I
DO NOT REPEAT NOT FULLY SHARE) THAT, GIVEN THE MILITARY'S POSITION,
IT WOULD NOT BE TOO DIFFICULT FOR ECEVIT'S REPUBLICAN
PEOPLE'S PARTY TO ACCEPT A COMPARABLE TERRITORIAL
STANCE.

G. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUERIES, MY COLLEAGUE DECLINED
TO BE MORE SPECIFIC, SAYING THAT HE ALREADY JEOPAR-
DIZED HIS CAREER BY TELLING ME THIS MUCH. THIS WAS NOT
INCLUDED IN WHAT CAGLAYANGIL HAD EXPECTED HIM TO TELL
ME, AND HE REPEATED THAT IF THESE COMMENTS WERE
EVER TIED TO HIS NAME, HE WOULD HAVE TO DENY THEM. HE
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PAGE 02 ANKARA 02482 02 OF 02 041843Z

HAD MADE THEM, HOWEVER, SO THAT I WOULD NOT THINK HIS
TALK ABOUT REAL PROGRESS AFTER THE ELECTION WAS JUST
TALK. IF AN ELECTION RESULT COULD BE OBTAINED WHICH
PERMITTED THE FORMULATION OF A GOVERNMENT WITHOUT
ERBAKAN, SERIOUS AND BONA FIDE NEGOTIATIONS COULD BEGIN
ABOUT THREE MONTHS THEREAFTER, AND HE THOUGHT A SOLUTION
COULD BE OBTAINED RELATIVELY SOON AFTER THAT. IT WAS

PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT, THEREFORE, TO HAVE USG HELP IN AVOIDING, IN THE MEANTIME, A BREAK IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE MEETINGS COULD BE SLOWED AS TO PACE BUT THEY SHOULD BE KEPT GOING FOR A MUTUAL PROBING EXERCISE AND FOR CLEARING AWAY FACTUAL QUESTIONS IN PREPARATION FOR THE POST-ELECTION DISCUSSIONS.

3. I EXPRESSED DISCOURAGEMENT OVER WHAT HE HAD TOLD ME. I NOTED THAT THE GOT HAD COMMITTED ITSELF TO "SUSTAINED" NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT WHAT HE WAS NOW TELLING ME FELL FAR SHORT OF MEETING THAT COMMITMENT. HE RECOGNIZED THIS, HE SAID, AND ADDED THAT IT WAS THEREFORE PERHAPS NOT WISE OF HIM TO BE SO FRANK WITH ME. AL

L HE COULD SAY WAS THAT A MAJOR BONA FIDE EFFORT HAD BEEN MADE WITHIN THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT TO LIVE UP TO ITS CLIFFORD COMMITMENTS. AT ONE POINT IN THIS EFFORT HE HIMSELF HAD FELT GREAT OPTIMISM, GIVEN THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN THE EFFORT, BUT IN THE END IT HAD FAILED. IF THE GOT'S FAILURE IN THIS REGARD IS NOW EXPLOITED BY THE GREEKS, SO AS TO BRING ABOUT A BREAK IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE OPTION OF A RESTORED US/TURKISH SECURITY PARTNERSHIP COULD BE LOST TO BOTH TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES.

4. I COUNTERED BY SAYING THAT WHAT PARTICULARLY DISCOURAGED ME WAS THAT THE GOT APPEARED NOW TO HAVE QUIT IN THE EFFORT TO MEET ITS COMMITMENTS TO SECRETARY CLIFFORD. NO ONE IN THE USG WOULD BE SURPRISED TO LEARN THAT CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 ANKARA 02482 02 OF 02 041843Z

INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES HAD BEEN ENCOUNTERED, BUT THIS WAS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM GIVING UP - AS HE WAS NOW UNOFFICIALLY, BUT UNEQUIVOCALLY, TELLING ME THAT THE GOT WAS DOING UNTIL THE ELECTIONS WERE OVER. MY INTERLOCUTOR SAID THAT THE FONMIN STILL TALKED ABOUT TRYING TO DO SOMETHING BUT IN FACT THERE WAS NOTHING MORE TO BE DONE. THERE IS A POWER VACUUM HERE, HE SAID, WHICH PREVENTS DEALING WITH ANY IMPORTANT PROBLEMS. IN ADDITION THE GOT WAS VERY MUCH DISADVANTAGED BY THE USG'S TACTIC OF DELAYING ACTION ON THE DCA. THE KEY MOMENT IN THE NSC DEBATE HAD COME WHEN ERBAKAN AND HIS FOLLOWERS CHALLENGED THE PRIMIN; "EVEN IF WE DO WHAT YOU ARE ASKING, CAN YOU GIVE US ASSURANCE THAT THE US WILL THEN MOVE THE DCA?" THE PRIMIN COULD NOT GIVE THIS ASSURANCE. "THAT IS WHAT FINALLY DEFEATED US," MY COLLEAGUE SAID. TO GIVE AN INDICATION OF THE BITTERNESS OF THE MEETING, HE ADDED THAT "ONE OF ERBAKAN'S GANG," MINISTER OF INTERIOR ASILTURK, HAD EVEN THREATENED GENERAL SANCAR, TGS CHAIRMAN. ASILTURK DID THIS BY

SAYING THAT IT WOULD NOT BE A GOOD THING IF THE TURKISH PUBLIC SHOULD LEARN THAT GENERAL SANCAR WAS MAKING SUCH A GENEROUS OFFER TO THE US AND THE GREEKS.

5. I WAS SURE, I SAID, THAT THE US WOULD WISH TO DO ALL IT COULD TO PREVENT THE TALKS FROM RUPTURING, BUT WHAT COULD I TELL WASHINGTON THE TURKS WOULD BE PREPARED TO DO? THE REPLY WAS THAT THE TURKS CAN DO NOTHING MORE THAN THEY HAVE DONE. I THEN READ POINTS A, B, C AND D, PARA 1, IN STATE 73272, AND SUGGESTED THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE TURKS AT A MINIMUM MEET POINTS C AND D (NEITHER SIDE TO DISMISS OTHER'S PROPOSAL, AND EACH SHOULD GIVE DETAILED COMMENTS REGARDING THEIR PROBLEMS WITH THE PROPOSALS BEFORE THEM). "THAT IS WHAT WE HAVE DONE," NO COLLEAGUE ASSERTED, TO WHICH I RESPONDED, "KEEP DOING IT."

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PAGE 04 ANKARA 02482 02 OF 02 041843Z

6. OUR CONVERSATION THEN CONCLUDED WITH THE MFA OFFICIAL'S REITERATING THAT WHILE PROSPECTS WERE DISCOURAGING IN THE SHORT RUN, HE FELT THAT THEY WERE CONSIDERABLY BETTER IN THE LONGER TERM AS A RESULT OF THE POSITION THAT ALL BUT THE ERBAKAN ELEMENT HAD NOW TAKEN. HE WAS CONCERNED, HOWEVER, THAT THESE LONGER TERM PROSPECTS COULD BE DAMAGED IF THE DCA AND THE US/TURKISH RELATIONSHIPS BECAME EMBROILED IN THE FORTHCOMING CAMPAIGN. THE DANGERS OF THIS MIGHT BE LESSENERED CONSIDERABLY IF THERE WERE ANY PROSPECT OF THE USG'S BEGINNING ACTIVELY TO SEEK THE DCA'S PASSAGE THROUGH THE CONGRESS, HE SAID, AND HE ASKED WHETHER I THOUGHT THERE WAS ANY IMMEDIATE PROSPECT OF THIS. I SAID WASHINGTON MIGHT POSSIBLY ENDORSE THE DCA AT SOME POINT FAIRLY EARLY ON, BUT I KNEW OF NO PRESENT PLANS FOR SCHEDULING EARLY CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION.

7. MY COLLEAGUE'S FINAL COMMENT WAS REVEALING. HE SAID THAT TURKEY'S PRESENT POLICY WAS BEING CONTROLLED BY "FANATICS" (THE ERBAKAN GROUP) WHO LIVE IN A "DREAM WORLD." WHATEVER THEY SAY, THEIR REAL OBJECTIVE IS NOT TO PREVENT GIVING UP TERRITORY ON CYPRUS. THEY DON'T REALLY CARE ABOUT THAT. WHAT THEY WANT TO DO IS FORCE A BREAK BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE WEST - PARTICULARLY WITH THE UNITED STATES -- SO THAT THEY CAN TURN BACK TO THE WORLD OF ISLAM WHICH IS WAITING FOR TURKISH LEADERSHIP. THEY REALLY BELIEVE THIS "FANTASY," MY COLLEAGUE SAID. AS FOR PRESIDENT KORUTURK AND GENERAL SANCAR, THEY ARE BOTH ANGRY AND FRUSTRATED OVER THE PRESENT SITUATION. DISGUSTED AS THEY ARE BY THE USG'S JEOPARDIZING THE TURKISH FLANK

OF NATO OVER WHAT THEY REGARD AS THE FAR LESS IMPORTANT
MATTER OF CYPRUS, THEY ALSO FEEL THAT TURKEY HAS GOTTEN
ITSELF INTO AN "ABSURD" (PRESIDENT KORUTURK'S WORD)
SITUATION IN ALSO ALLOWING THIS FAR LESSER MATTER TO
JEOPARDIZE TURKEY'S BASIC SECURITY INTERESTS.
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PAGE 05 ANKARA 02482 02 OF 02 041843Z

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 04-Apr-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977ANKARA02482
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770116-1123
Format: TEL
From: ANKARA
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770493/aaaadcus.tel
Line Count: 344
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 4a4801ab-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS, NOFORN
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS, NOFORN
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 18-Nov-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2913093
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CYPRUS: RESTRAINTS ON TURKISH POLICY
TAGS: PFOR, TU, CY, GR
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/4a4801ab-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009